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This article addresses four interrelated research questions: (1) Does experienced
mood affect emotion perception in faces and is this perception mood-congruent
or mood-incongruent? (2) Are there age-group differences in the interplay between
experienced mood and emotion perception? (3) Does emotion perception in faces change
as a function of the temporal sequence of study sessions and stimuli presentation, and
(4) does emotion perception in faces serve a mood-regulatory function? One hundred
fifty-four adults of three different age groups (younger: 20–31 years; middle-aged: 44–55
years; older adults: 70–81 years) were asked to provide multidimensional emotion ratings
of a total of 1026 face pictures of younger, middle-aged, and older men and women,
each displaying six different prototypical (primary) emotional expressions. By analyzing the
likelihood of ascribing an additional emotional expression to a face whose primary emotion
had been correctly recognized, the multidimensional rating approach permits the study of
emotion perception while controlling for emotion recognition. Following up on previous
research on mood responses to recurring unpleasant situations using the same dataset
(Voelkle et al., 2013), crossed random effects analyses supported a mood-congruent
relationship between experienced mood and perceived emotions in faces. In particular
older adults were more likely to perceive happiness in faces when being in a positive
mood and less likely to do so when being in a negative mood. This did not apply to younger
adults. Temporal sequence of study sessions and stimuli presentation had a strong effect
on the likelihood of ascribing an additional emotional expression. In contrast to previous
findings, however, there was neither evidence for a change from mood-congruent to
mood-incongruent responses over time nor evidence for a mood-regulatory effect.
Keywords: emotion perception, mood-(in)congruent information processing, mood regulation, faces, crossed
random effects analysis
INTRODUCTION
How does the way we feel influence the perception of the
world around us, and how does this perception in turn affect
our own feelings? As innocuous as it may seem, this question
constitutes one of the most fundamental research objectives
in psychology, ranging from basic research on attention and
perception (e.g., Becker and Leinenger, 2011; Hunter et al.,
2011) to research in clinical psychology and psychiatry (e.g.,
Elliott et al., 2002; Eizenman et al., 2003; Rinck et al., 2003;
Stuhrmann et al., 2013). For example, cognitive theories of anx-
iety and depression suggest attentional and memory biases of
patients suffering from anxiety or depression toward threaten-
ing, respectively dysphoric, stimuli, which in turn contributes
to the maintenance or aggravation of the disorder (Clark et al.,
1999; Beevers and Carver, 2003; Koster et al., 2010). In particular
the question of mood-congruent vs. mood-incongruent informa-
tion processing, its determinants and consequences, has sparked
a lot of research. The present paper contributes to this litera-
ture by investigating the relationship between experienced mood
and the perception of emotional expression in faces, which has
been shown to be important for individuals’ social interactions
(e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Adolphs, 2003). Special emphasis
will be put on age-related differences in mood-(in)congruent
information processing, the role of the temporal sequence of
study sessions and stimuli presentation, and the question whether
mood may not only affect emotion perception, but whether
emotion perception may also serve a mood-regulatory function.
As will be outlined in the following, a number of different
theoretical models have been proposed to explain the—in
parts conflicting—empirical findings on mood-congruent vs.
mood-incongruent information processing:
MOOD-CONGRUENT INFORMATION PROCESSING
There exists ample evidence that information is often processed
in a mood-congruent manner. For example, people in a posi-
tive mood are more likely to recall positive memories (Bower,
1981, 1991; Mayer et al., 1995), and report to be more sat-
isfied with their lives (Schwarz and Clore, 1983). Mood con-
gruency effects were also observed for emotion perception in
faces. The pattern of findings, however, is somewhat mixed. For
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example, Coupland et al. (2004) demonstrated that low pos-
itive affect (anhedonia) decreased the identification of happy
expressions, while negative affect increased the identification of
disgust. Contrary to expectations, however, there was no increase
in anger identification related to negative affect. Furthermore,
Suzuki et al. (2007) found partial support for a mood-congruency
effect by observing a positive correlation between negative affect
and recognition of sadness. However, this effect did not general-
ize to other negative emotions. In addition, age-related decrease
in sadness recognition was linked to an age-related decrease
in negative affect. For similar findings on the relation between
age-related decline in the perceived intensity of emotions in
faces and age-related decrease in anxiety and depression see
Phillips and Allen (2004).
At a more general level, the mood-congruency effect has been
explained in terms of Bower’s (1981) associative network theory.
This theory refers to the idea that emotions serve as memory
units and that activation of such a unit not only “aids retrieval of
events associated with it [but. . . ] also primes emotional themata
for use in free association, fantasies, and perceptual categoriza-
tion” (Bower, 1981, p. 129). The effect has also been explained
in terms of mood as information (Schwarz and Clore, 2003, p.
296), that is, the idea that mood may serve an informational
function and may help in directing attention to possible sources
of feelings (Wyer and Carlston, 1979; Schwarz and Clore, 1983,
2003). Although both approaches suggest mood-congruent infor-
mation processing, the proposed mechanisms differ. According to
the associative network theory, mood influences information pro-
cessing indirectly by priming the encoding, retrieval, and use of
information, for example by selectively attending to “activated”
mood-congruent details in the environment, by selectively encod-
ing information into a network of primed associations, or by
selectively retrieving mood-congruent information. According to
the mood-as-information account, mood influences information
processing directly. By (implicitly) asking themselves “. . . how do
I feel about this? [. . . people. . . ] misread their current feelings as a
response to the object of judgment, resulting in more favorable
evaluations under positive rather than negative moods, unless
their informational value is discredited” (Schwarz and Clore,
2003, p. 299).
In an attempt to integrate these seemingly contradictory
explanations, Forgas (1995) proposed the affect infusion model
(AIM), which states the more general preconditions for mood-
congruency effects in judgmental processes. According to the
AIM, affect-priming, in the sense of Bower’s (1981) associa-
tive network theory, is most likely to occur during substantive
processing, that is, in situations with complex, atypical, and/or
personally relevant targets. For example, when being in a happy
mood, people evaluate others more favorably than when being in
a sadmood, in particular when judging unusual, atypical, persons
(Forgas, 1992).
In contrast, mood-as-information (Schwarz and Clore, 1983)
is the major affect infusion mechanism during heuristic pro-
cessing, that is, in situations involving typical targets of low
personal relevance and/or in situations with limited processing
capacity (e.g., due to time pressure or information overload;
Forgas, 1995).
MOOD-INCONGRUENT INFORMATION PROCESSING AS A
MOOD-REGULATORY FUNCTION
In addition to the various findings on mood-congruency effects,
a number of studies suggested that information may also be pro-
cessed in a mood-incongruent manner (Morris and Reilly, 1987;
Matt et al., 1992; Erber and Erber, 1994; Sedikides, 1994; Forgas
and Ciarrochi, 2002; Isaacowitz et al., 2008, 2009b). For exam-
ple, in two recent articles Isaacowitz and colleagues (Isaacowitz
et al., 2008, 2009b) showed that older adults gazed toward posi-
tively valenced facial stimuli when in a bad mood. In contrast, a
mood-congruency effect was observed in younger adults, in that
they were more likely to look at positively valenced faces when
in a good mood and more likely to look at negatively valenced
faces when in a bad mood. Based on the observed age-differential
relationship between mood and gazing pattern, Isaacowitz et al.
(2008) concluded that “in older adults, gaze does not reflect
mood, but rather is used to regulate it” (2008; p. 848). This
interpretation is in line with socioemotional selectivity theory,
which postulates that older adults—because of a shrinking time
horizon—shift their motivational priorities toward emotion reg-
ulation (Carstensen et al., 1999; Carstensen, 2006). Furthermore,
given that most studies on mood-(in)congruent information
processing used college-student populations, this finding cau-
tions generalizations to other populations and underscores the
importance of studying different age groups.
Building upon the first, congruency; then, incongruency hypoth-
esis postulated by Sedikides (1994, p. 163), Forgas and Ciarrochi
(2002) showed, in a series of three experiments, that after an ini-
tial mood-congruency effect, people in a sad mood were more
likely to generate positive person descriptions, positive person-
ality trait adjectives, as well as positive self-descriptions. These
findings were interpreted in terms of a spontaneous, homeostatic,
mood management mechanism “that limit[s] affect congruence
and thus allow[s] people to control and calibrate their mood
states by selectively accessing more affect-incongruent responses
over time” (Forgas and Ciarrochi, 2002, p. 337). Thus, the tem-
poral sequence of information processing seems to play a crucial
role in the interplay between experienced mood and information
processing. This may also apply to the processing of emotional
expressions in faces as investigated in the present study.
What the studies by Isaacowitz and colleagues and Forgas and
colleagues have in common is that differences inmood-congruent
vs. mood-incongruent information processing are explained in
terms of mood regulation. That is, by focusing on stimuli of a
certain valence, people attempt to manage their mood (e.g., they
up-regulate their mood when previously in a bad mood). In con-
trast to work on mood-congruent attentional and memory biases
for negatively valenced material, the mechanisms underlying a
mood-incongruent bias toward positively valenced stimuli have
been less clearly spelled out. However, given the functional rele-
vance of mood-congruent information processing for dysphoria
and depression (e.g., Clark et al., 1999; Beevers and Carver, 2003;
Koster et al., 2010), it seems reasonable to assume that focus-
ing on positively valenced stimuli when in a bad mood may help
to counteract this effect. The underlying mechanism may either
constitute a rather spontaneous, homeostatic mood management
(Forgas and Ciarrochi, 2002) or active mood regulation.
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While Isaacowitz and colleagues explained the
mood-congruency vs. mood-incongruency effect in terms of
age (“mood-congruent gaze in younger adults, positive gaze in
older adults”, Isaacowitz et al., 2008, p. 848), Forgas and Ciarrochi
explained the effect in terms of elapsed processing time (“initially
mood-congruent responses tend to be automatically corrected
and reversed over time,” Forgas and Ciarrochi, 2002, p. 344;
see also Sedikides, 1994). Such mood-incongruent information
processing is also in line with the AIM, which postulates that
mood-congruency effects will be eliminated, or reversed, if a
person is influenced by a strong motivational component, such
as to improve mood when being in a bad mood (i.e., motivated
processing; Erber and Erber, 1994; Forgas, 1995). In the absence
of a strong motivational component, the AIM proposes the direct
access strategy as another type of a low affect infusion strategy,
that is, an information processing strategy that is unlikely to
result in a mood-congruency effect. “Direct access processing is
most likely when the target is well known or familiar and has
highly prototypical features that cue an already-stored and avail-
able judgment, the judge is not personally involved, and there are
no strong cognitive, affective, motivational, or situational forces
mandating more elaborate processing” (Forgas, 1995, p. 46). We
will get back to this strategy in the discussion. For a more detailed
description of the AIM, and the four alternative processing
strategies related to low affect infusion (motivated processing
and direct access strategy) and high affect infusion (heuristic and
substantive processing), we refer the reader to Forgas (1995).
To summarize, current research has provided ample support
for mood-congruent, but also mood-incongruent, information
processing. The AIM provides a general framework that pre-
dicts the degree of mood-(in)congruency in information process-
ing (Forgas, 1995). According to this model, mood-congruency
effects are most likely under substantive processing or heuris-
tic processing which is in line with Bower’s (1981) associative
network theory, and Schwarz and Clore’s (1983) theory of mood-
as-information, respectively. In contrast, mood-congruency is
least likely in case of motivated processing or the direct access
strategy. Especially when in a bad mood, people may be moti-
vated to change this state. As suggested by Isaacowitz et al.
(2008), this motivation may be particularly strong in older adults.
Furthermore, Forgas and Ciarrochi (2002) observed a shift from
mood-congruent to mood-incongruent information processing,
pointing to the role of homeostatic cognitive strategies in affect
regulation. However, when explaining mood-incongruent infor-
mation processing in terms of mood regulation, the crucial—and
often untested—question is how effective is it in changing peo-
ples’ mood? In a recent eye-tracking study, Isaacowitz et al.
(2009a,b) showed that older adults with good cognitive function-
ing showed less mood decline throughout the study when gazing
toward positively valenced faces. This provides initial support for
the notion that in some people mood-incongruent information
processing may serve a mood-regulatory function.
Overall, the research reviewed so far indicates that effects of
experienced mood on information processing are by no means
simple, but influenced by multiple factors. With few exceptions
(e.g., Mayer et al., 1995), most studies on mood-(in)congruent
information processing involved active mood induction. Little
is known about the extent to which these findings generalize
to naturally occurring mood. Moreover, in real-life situations
the various mechanisms underlying mood-(in)congruent infor-
mation processing may work simultaneously and are likely to
influence each other. For example, being in a moderately gloomy
mood may prime the associative network toward the perception
of negatively valenced features in the environment. This in turn
may be perceived as more negative because of one’s gloomymood
(mood-as-information). At the same time, this may increase the
motivation to improve one’s mood by selectively attending to
positively valenced features in the environment, possibly elimi-
nating or even reversing a mood-congruency effect. At present it
is unclear which of these processes will prevail under less extreme
conditions of natural mood, rather than experimentally induced
mood.
THIS STUDY
The purpose of the present study was to link naturally occur-
ring fluctuations in mood to the perception of emotions in
faces in order to provide new insights into mood-congruent vs.
mood-incongruent information processing. To this end we (1)
examined whether natural mood affects emotion perception in
faces and to what extent this perception was mood-congruent or
mood-incongruent. We (2) tested for age group differences in the
interplay between emotion perception and experienced mood,
and (3) investigated the role of temporal sequence in emotion
processing. Finally, we (4) examined the extent to which emotion
perception in faces may serve a mood-regulatory function.
Based on previous findings reviewed above, and indepen-
dent of age, we expected mood-congruent processing of emo-
tional expressions in faces—operationalized as a higher likelihood
of perceiving a positively valenced emotional expression when
in a good mood, and a negatively valenced emotional expres-
sion when in a bad mood (Hypothesis 1). In line with prior
research, but competing with Hypothesis 1, we expected older
adults to have a higher likelihood of perceiving positive emo-
tions in facial expressions when in a bad mood (Hypothesis 2).
In addition, we expected a shift from mood-congruent to mood-
incongruent information processing as a function of processing
time (Hypothesis 3). Based on prior research, we expected a pos-
itive relationship between the likelihood of perceiving positively
valenced emotions in faces and subsequent improvements in
mood (Hypothesis 4), supporting the notion of amood-regulatory
function of emotion perception.
To test these hypotheses, we asked young, middle-aged, and
older adults to indicate the amount of happiness, sadness, fear,
disgust, anger, and neutrality they perceived in photographs of
faces displaying prototypical happy, sad, fearful, disgusted, angry,
or neutral facial expressions. Of importance, using a multidimen-
sional rating approach, participants had rated all six emotions for
each prototypical facial expression. For example, although a face
may have been correctly recognized as displaying anger (proto-
typical primary expression), participants could indicate that they
also perceived some sadness, or any of the other emotion(s), in
the same face. In terms of the AIM, recognizing a prototypical
facial expression is likely the result of either a direct access or
motivational processing strategy and thus unlikely to infuse affect
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(Forgas, 1995). In addition, individuals differ in their ability to
recognize prototypical facial expressions, with age as an impor-
tant predictor of these differences (see Ruffman et al., 2008, for an
overview)1 . For these reasons we were not interested in emotion
recognition, but in the likelihood of ascribing an additional emo-
tional expression to a face, whose primary emotion had already
been correctly recognized. This procedure controls2 for differ-
ences in emotion recognition and maximizes the likelihood of
affect infusion (i.e., a mood-congruency or mood-incongruency
effect). Throughout the remainder of this paper, the term emotion
perception thus refers to the perception of additional emotional
expressions in a face (other than the primary expression), once its
primary emotional expression had been correctly recognized (see
Methods section for details).
The present article follows up on previous work with the
same dataset in which we investigated anticipatory and reactive
mood changes throughout the course of the study (Voelkle et al.,
2013), age-of-perceiver and age-of-rater effects on multidimen-
sional emotion perception (Riediger et al., 2011), and accuracy
and bias in age estimation (Voelkle et al., 2012). Until now, how-
ever, we never linked participants’ mood to the perception of
emotion in others (faces), which is the primary aim of the present
study.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
One hundred fifty-four adults of three different age groups
(n = 52 younger adults: 20–31 years; n = 51 middle-aged adults:
44–55 years; n = 51 older adults: 70–81 years) participated in
the study. All of the 76 women and 78 men were Caucasian and
German-speaking. Self-reported physical functioning was good,
and visual-processing speed, as assessed byWechsler’s (1981) digit
symbol substitution test, was comparable to typical performance
levels in these age groups. For details about the demographic
composition of the sample, see Ebner et al. (2010).
PROCEDURE
The study was approved by the MPI ethics review board. Figure 1
provides a graphical illustration of the study procedure. After
giving informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to
1For an analysis of age differences in emotional expression identification as
a function of perceiver’s and face model’s age and facial expression with the
present data, we refer the reader to Ebner et al. (2010).
2Although we disentangle the perception of additional emotional expressions
from emotion recognition by analyzing only correctly recognized emotions,
this does not preclude the possibility that people with higher recognition
ability (and possible age differences therein) may be less likely to ascribe
additional emotional expressions to a face after having identified the pri-
mary emotional expression. To control for this possibility, we repeated all
analyses by including the person-specific recognition ability as an additional
covariate. As a matter of fact, higher recognition ability decreased the like-
lihood of perceiving an additional emotional expression significantly (logit
= − 10.750; p < 0.001). In addition, the slightly lower (and non-significant
at a 0.01 alpha level) likelihood of younger adults of perceiving an additional
emotional expression disappeared after controlling for recognition ability.
All other results, however, remained virtually unaffected by controlling for
person-specific recognition ability. The additional analyses are provided as
online Supplementary Materials A and B.
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the study procedure. Present mood was
assessed at the beginning and the end of each session. During each
session, participants rated the emotional expression of different face
pictures by adjusting a slider. In addition, the primary emotional expression
(happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear, or neutrality) was assessed via
categorical rating.
one of two sets of parallel face pictures, which were presented
one at a time on a 19-inch monitor. For each picture, partici-
pants indicated in a self-paced fashion the degree of happiness,
sadness, fear, disgust, anger, or neutrality perceived in the face on
a scale from 0 (does not apply at all) to 100 (applies completely).
After these continuous ratings, participants indicated which of
the six emotions was primarily displayed in the face (categorical
rating). This was followed by additional face-specific questions
that are not of relevance for the present paper. Due to the large
number of face stimuli, participants had to complete the ratings
in several sessions. Each session lasted for 100min and there was
only one session per day. Although it took up to 24 sessions for
the slowest participant to complete all ratings, we restricted our
analyses to the first 10 sessions to maintain comparability with
previous research and to avoid increasing sparseness of the data.
Participants’ mood was assessed at the beginning and at the end
of each session.
MEASURES
Positive and negative mood was assessed using Hampel’s (1977)
Adjective Scales to Assess Mood. For positive mood, participants
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Table 1 | Results of a crossed random effects analysis predicting the likelihood of perceiving an (additional but the primary) emotional
expression in a face by type of emotion, positive mood, session number, stimulus number, and age group.
Parameter Estimate SE t-value p-value
(A)
Intercept (baseline: neutrality) −1.9777 0.1230 −16.07 0.000
Happiness −0.7191 0.018 −39.94 0.000
Anger 1.0122 0.0147 69.03 0.000
Disgust 0.7639 0.0147 51.88 0.000
Sadness 0.7937 0.0147 53.90 0.000
Fear 0.9049 0.0147 61.53 0.000
Session −0.1340 0.0016 −83.71 0.000
Session squared 0.0173 0.0006 29.25 0.000
Younger adults (baseline: neutrality) −0.3635 0.1727 −2.10 0.035
Older adults (baseline: neutrality) 0.1622 0.1736 0.93 0.350
Happiness × younger adults −0.0446 0.025 −1.78 0.075
Happiness × older adults −0.0179 0.0265 −0.68 0.499
Anger × younger adults 0.0717 0.0202 3.55 0.000
Anger × older adults 0.0619 0.0216 2.87 0.004
Disgust × younger adults 0.1361 0.0203 6.72 0.000
Disgust × older adults 0.0318 0.0217 1.47 0.142
Sadness × younger adults 0.1819 0.0203 8.98 0.000
Sadness × older adults −0.0182 0.0217 −0.84 0.403
Fear × younger adults 0.0727 0.0203 3.59 0.000
Fear × older adults 0.1388 0.0216 6.41 0.000
(B) MOOD−CONGRUENT vs. MOOD−INCONGRUENT INFORMATION PROCESSING IN FACES
Positive mood (baseline: neutrality) 0.0481 0.0155 3.11 0.002
Positive mood × happiness 0.1177 0.0207 5.69 0.000
Positive mood × anger −0.0365 0.0167 −2.19 0.029
Positive mood × disgust −0.0595 0.0167 −3.56 0.000
Positive mood × sadness −0.0560 0.0167 −3.34 0.001
Positive mood × fear −0.1086 0.0167 −6.50 0.000
(C) AGE GROUP DIFFERENCES IN MOOD−CONGRUENT vs. MOOD−INCONGRUENT INFORMATION PROCESSING
Positive mood × younger adults (baseline: neutrality) 0.0305 0.0204 1.50 0.135
Positive mood × older adults (baseline: neutrality) −0.1302 0.0236 −5.53 0.000
Positive mood × happiness × younger adults −0.1567 0.0288 −5.44 0.000
Positive mood × happiness × older adults 0.1512 0.0305 4.96 0.000
Positive mood × anger × younger adults −0.0128 0.0227 −0.56 0.573
Positive mood × anger × older adults 0.0056 0.0244 0.23 0.818
Positive mood × disgust × younger adults −0.0580 0.0228 −2.55 0.011
Positive mood × disgust × older adults 0.0764 0.0245 3.12 0.002
Positive mood × sadness × younger adults 0.0344 0.0228 1.51 0.131
Positive mood × sadness × older adults 0.0810 0.0246 3.29 0.001
Positive mood × fear × younger adults 0.0149 0.0228 0.65 0.513
Positive mood × fear × older adults −0.0291 0.0244 −1.19 0.234
(D) TEMPORAL SEQUENCE IN MOOD−CONGRUENT vs. MOOD−INCONGRUENT INFORMATION PROCESSING
Stimulus number (baseline: neutrality) −0.0004 0.0004 −1.05 0.295
Happiness × stimulus number −0.0028 0.0006 −4.43 0.000
Anger × stimulus number −0.0026 0.0005 −4.97 0.000
Disgust × stimulus number −0.0029 0.0005 −5.63 0.000
Sadness × stimulus number −0.0016 0.0005 −3.09 0.002
Fear × stimulus number −0.0017 0.0005 −3.36 0.001
Positive mood × stimulus number (baseline: neutrality) −0.0008 0.0005 −1.75 0.079
Positive mood × happiness × stimulus number 0.0011 0.0007 1.49 0.137
Positive mood × anger × stimulus number 0.0014 0.0006 2.36 0.018
Positive mood × disgust × stimulus number 0.0014 0.0006 2.44 0.015
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Parameter Estimate SE t-value p-value
Positive mood × sadness × stimulus number 0.0006 0.0006 1.01 0.314
Positive mood × fear × stimulus number 0.0010 0.0006 1.63 0.102
Random intercept face Variance = 0.016; SD = 0.127
Random intercept participant Variance = 2.289; SD = 1.513
AIC 379620.8
BIC 380192.4
Log-likelihood −189758.4
Deviance 379516.8
Type of emotion was dummy coded with perception of neutral emotional expression as baseline. Session = grand mean centered session number; Session squared
= squared grand mean centered session number; Age group of participant (younger, middle-aged, older adults) was effect coded; Positive mood was group mean
centered by subtracting the average positive mood at each study session; Stimulus number = individually centered position of stimulus in the sequence of stimuli
within each session. Faces and participants were treated as two crossed random effects.
indicated on a scale from one to five the extent to which they
currently felt happy, cheerful, elated, in high spirits, relaxed,
mellow, and exuberant. Negative mood was assessed using the
seven items insecure, sorrowful, disappointed, hopeless, melan-
cholic, downhearted, and helpless. Corrected item-scale corre-
lations for positive mood at the first measurement time point
ranged between 0.51 and 0.79 (Cronbach’s α = 0.89) and between
0.41 and 0.63 (Cronbach’s α = 0.81) for negative mood (see
Voelkle et al., 2013).
STIMULI
Face photographs of 58 younger (19–31 years), 56 middle-aged
(39–55 years), and 57 older (69–80 years) adults were used as
stimulus material. The photographs were taken from the FACES
Lifespan Database of Facial Expressions (Ebner et al., 2010),
which contains in two parallel sets a total of 2052 pictures, dis-
playing each of the 171 target persons with a prototypical happy,
angry, sad, disgusted, fearful, or neutral facial expression (i.e., the
pictures were taken at the peak of the emotional expression, fol-
lowing a standardized production and selection procedure in line
with the Affect Program Theory of facial expressions by Ekman,
1993). In line with the race and ethnicity of study participants and
in order to reduce the design complexity (e.g., by avoiding possi-
ble race-biased in-group vs. out-group effects; cf. Meissner and
Brigham, 2001) all face models were Caucasian. For details on the
construction of the FACES database see Ebner et al. (2010).
ANALYSIS
For each of the 1026 photographs (171 individuals times six
emotions), N = 154 participants were asked to provide con-
tinuous emotion ratings on six different emotions, resulting in
a theoretical maximum of 1026× 6 × 154 = 948,024 ratings
(plus the categorical emotion ratings and other ratings as men-
tioned above). Given that the face pictures displayed maximally
prototypical emotional expressions, with about 80%3, the aver-
age recognition rate of the primary emotional expression was
3The average recognition rate of emotional expressions differed across emo-
tions and age groups. For a more detailed analysis, see Ebner et al. (2010).
fairly high. As noted before, we were not interested in emotion
recognition, but in the likelihood of ascribing an additional emo-
tional expression to a face, for which the primary emotion had
already been correctly recognized. Therefore, we controlled for
interindividual differences in accuracy of emotion recognition,
by including only ratings of those stimuli of which the primary
emotional expression had been correctly identified (as indicated
by the categorical ratings). Furthermore, we decided to analyze
the likelihood with which an additional emotional expression was
perceived in a face rather than the intensity of this perception.
The reasons for this decision were twofold: First, the ratings of
the additional emotions attributed to a face followed a highly
right-skewed distribution. Despite correctly recognizing the pri-
mary facial expressions, some individuals indicated additional
emotions of 100 (highest intensity of emotion expression) on a
scale from 0 to 100. In addition, some people seemed to have
used the middle of the rating scale as a reference point for some
of their ratings. As a consequence, we could not find a mean-
ingful transformation (such as a log-transform) that would have
resulted in homoscedastic and normally distributed residuals.
Second, in about 74% of the ratings, no additional continuous
emotion ratings were provided resulting in a preponderance of
zeros. Although models have been developed to deal with the
combination of a zero-inflated and continuous or count part
(Hall, 2000; Olsen and Schafer, 2001), we are not aware of any
readily available integration with crossed random effects analyses
employed in the present paper. Future research in this direction
will be desirable.
Differences in the likelihood to perceive an emotion in addi-
tion to the primary emotion were modeled as a function of the
type of emotion (happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, neu-
trality; dummy coded with neutrality as baseline), mood at the
beginning of the session (group mean centered at the average
mood level prior to each session), study session (1–10; grandmean
centered at 5.5), age group of perceiver (younger, middle-aged,
older; effects coded), stimulus number (i.e., the relative position
of a face photograph in the sequence of photographs presented
to an individual participant, centered at the average number of
stimuli rated by each individual in each session), and interactions
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Table 2 | Results of a crossed random effects analysis predicting the likelihood of perceiving an (additional but the primary) emotional
expression in a face by type of emotion, negative mood, session number, stimulus number, and age group.
Parameter Estimate SE t-value p-value
(A)
Intercept (baseline: neutrality) −1.9633 0.1228 −15.98 0.000
Happiness −0.7409 0.0190 −39.06 0.000
Anger 0.9784 0.0151 64.99 0.000
Disgust 0.7296 0.0151 48.26 0.000
Sadness 0.7607 0.0151 50.32 0.000
Fear 0.8637 0.0151 57.13 0.000
Session −0.1331 0.0016 −82.89 0.000
Session squared 0.0174 0.0006 29.29 0.000
Younger adults (baseline: neutrality) −0.3565 0.1724 −2.07 0.039
Older adults (baseline: neutrality) 0.1484 0.1734 0.86 0.392
Happiness × younger adults −0.0519 0.0266 −1.95 0.051
Happiness × older adults −0.0735 0.0286 −2.56 0.010
Anger × younger adults 0.0529 0.021 2.52 0.012
Anger × older adults 0.0877 0.0221 3.96 0.000
Disgust × younger adults 0.0956 0.0211 4.53 0.000
Disgust × older adults 0.0631 0.0222 2.84 0.005
Sadness × younger adults 0.1713 0.0211 8.13 0.000
Sadness × older adults 0.0018 0.0223 0.08 0.936
Fear × younger adults 0.0169 0.0211 0.80 0.423
Fear × older adults 0.1773 0.0222 7.97 0.000
(B) MOOD−CONGRUENT vs. MOOD−INCONGRUENT INFORMATION PROCESSING IN FACES
Negative mood (baseline: neutrality) 0.0132 0.0265 0.50 0.618
Negative mood × happiness −0.2103 0.0396 −5.31 0.000
Negative mood × anger −0.0520 0.0299 −1.74 0.081
Negative mood × disgust 0.0514 0.0298 1.72 0.085
Negative mood × sadness −0.0500 0.0299 −1.67 0.094
Negative mood × fear 0.1490 0.0297 5.03 0.000
(C) AGE GROUP DIFFERENCES IN MOOD−CONGRUENT vs. MOOD−INCONGRUENT INFORMATION PROCESSING
Negative mood × younger adults (baseline: neutrality) −0.0585 0.0314 −1.86 0.063
Negative mood × older adults (baseline: neutrality) 0.0515 0.0422 1.22 0.222
Negative mood × happiness × younger adults 0.3286 0.0463 7.09 0.000
Negative mood × happiness × older adults −0.5495 0.0654 −8.40 0.000
Negative mood × anger × younger adults 0.2393 0.0357 6.70 0.000
Negative mood × anger × older adults 0.0460 0.0459 1.00 0.316
Negative mood × disgust × younger adults 0.2511 0.0357 7.04 0.000
Negative mood × disgust × older adults −0.0853 0.046 −1.86 0.063
Negative mood × sadness × younger adults 0.1920 0.0358 5.37 0.000
Negative mood × sadness × older adults −0.0669 0.0461 −1.45 0.147
Negative mood × fear × younger adults 0.2346 0.0355 6.60 0.000
Negative mood × fear × older adults −0.0040 0.0458 −0.09 0.931
(D) TEMPORAL SEQUENCE IN MOOD−CONGRUENT vs. MOOD−INCONGRUENT INFORMATION PROCESSING
Stimulus number (baseline: neutrality) −0.0005 0.0004 −1.38 0.167
Happiness × stimulus number −0.0026 0.0006 −4.31 0.000
Anger × stimulus number −0.0024 0.0005 −4.70 0.000
Disgust × stimulus number −0.0028 0.0005 −5.51 0.000
Sadness × stimulus number −0.0015 0.0005 −3.03 0.002
Fear × stimulus number −0.0016 0.0005 −3.13 0.002
Negative mood × stimulus number (baseline: neutrality) −0.0002 0.0007 −0.36 0.720
Negative mood × happiness × stimulus number 0.0011 0.0010 1.06 0.289
Negative mood × anger × stimulus number 0.0005 0.0008 0.64 0.525
(Continued)
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Table 2 | Continued
Parameter Estimate SE t-value p-value
Negative mood × disgust × stimulus number 0.0013 0.0008 1.53 0.126
Negative mood × sadness × stimulus number 0.0009 0.0008 1.04 0.297
Negative mood × fear × stimulus number 0.0002 0.0008 0.29 0.769
Random intercept face Variance = 0.016; SD = 0.127
Random intercept participant Variance = 2.280; SD = 1.510
AIC 379195.9
BIC 379767.5
Log-likelihood −189546.0
Deviance 379091.9
Type of emotion was dummy coded with perception of neutral emotional expression as baseline. Session = grand mean centered session number; Session squared
= squared grand mean centered session number; Age group of participant (younger, middle-aged, older adults) was effect coded; Negative mood was group mean
centered by subtracting the average negative mood at each study session; Stimulus number = individually centered position of the stimulus in the sequence of
stimuli within each session. Faces and participants were treated as two crossed random effects.
between these factors4. Faces and participants were treated as two
freely estimated crossed random effects in a generalized linear
mixed effects model with a logit link function using the lme4
package 1.0.4 (Bates et al., 2013; see also Pinheiro and Bates, 2000)
of R version 2.15.2 (R Core Team, 2012).
The possible role of emotion perception in faces as a mood-
regulatory function was investigated by predicting the pre- to
post-session changes in mood by how often a participant indi-
cated perceiving a certain emotional expression out of the total
number of ratings of this participant (i.e., the individual per-
centage of emotion perception in each session). In previous
work we have demonstrated that changes in pre- to post-session
mood decline significantly across the course of the entire study
and that this change-in-change is almost perfectly captured by
a logistic growth curve model (Voelkle et al., 2013). In order
to control for this general trend we used the same model as
in Voelkle et al. (2013) and added the interaction between age
group and percentage of perceived emotional expression as time
varying covariates with time varying effects5. To control for over-
all trends in emotion perception, session-mean centered scores
were used.
RESULTS
The results section is organized as follows: Table 1 contains all
parameter estimates of a single crossed random effects model
as described above. In the following, we report results on the
relationship between positive mood and emotion perception in
faces. The corresponding results regarding negative mood and
emotion perception are presented in Table 2. We will begin with
discussing differences between displayed emotions, changes in
4In a separate analysis, we included sex of participant as an additional pre-
dictor, which resulted in a non-significant improvement in model fit and
did not change the pattern of results or any of the substantive conclusions
(2Log-LikelihoodDiff = 1.2; dfDiff = 1). Because we had no prior expecta-
tions regarding sex effects, we report the analyses without sex.
5Missing values on the predictor variables due to study drop out were handled
via Expectation Maximization (EM) imputation.
emotion perception across study sessions, and age group differ-
ences in the perception of different emotions (Tables 1, 2, Part A).
Next, we will turn to the question of mood-congruent vs. mood-
incongruent information processing in faces by investigating the
effect of present mood on the perception of different emotions
in faces (Hypothesis 1; Tables 1, 2, Part B), as well as age group
differences in mood-congruent vs. mood-incongruent information
processing (Hypothesis 2; Tables 1, 2, Part C). After that we will
focus on the role of the temporal sequence in emotion processing
by analyzing the effect of stimulus position on emotion percep-
tion across the six different facial expressions along with a short
discussion of possible three-way interactions of mood× stimulus
position× emotion (Hypothesis 3; Tables 1, 2, Part D). Finally, we
will investigate the effectiveness of emotion perception in faces as a
mood-regulatory function (Hypothesis 4; Figure 4).
After recognizing the primary emotional expression, the aver-
age probability to perceive an additional neutral expression in a
randomly selected face picture, presented after half of the stim-
uli had been rated within a given study session, and after half of
the sessions had been completed was [100 · (1/(1 + e1.978))] =
12.16% in a participant with an average within-session posi-
tive mood. However, there were large differences between the
types of emotions: While the probability of perceiving an addi-
tional happy expression was significantly lower [100 · (1/(1 +
e1.978+0.719))] = 6.31% (logit = −0.719; odds ratio = 0.487;
p < 0.001), the probability of perceiving an additional angry
expression was significantly higher (27.58%; logit = 1.012; odds
ratio = 2.751; p < 0.001). The other emotions fell somewhere in
between. Likewise, the likelihood of reporting an additional (neu-
tral) emotional expression changed as a function of the number
of sessions, with a significantly higher likelihood at the begin-
ning of the study (20.82%) than after 10 sessions (6.79%). Note
that the decline was not linear but leveled off toward the end of
the study (i.e., a positive quadratic effect; logitLinear = −0.1340,
odds ratio = 0.875, p < 0.001; logitQuadratic = 0.017, odds ratio
= 1.017, p < 0.001). In contrast to the impact of session and
type of emotion, age group differences in the perception of dif-
ferent emotions were smaller and somewhat mixed. As compared
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to the average age (age groups are effects coded6), the likelihood to
perceive anger increased for both, younger (logitYounger = 0.072,
odds ratio = 1.07, p < 0.001) and older (logitOlder = 0.062,
odds ratio = 1.06, p < 0.001) adults. The same applied to fear
(logitYounger = 0.073, odds ratio = 1.08, p < 0.001; logitOlder =
0.139, odds ratio = 1.15, p < 0.001). In addition, the likeli-
hood of reporting disgust and sadness increased significantly in
younger adults. However, with an odds ratio of e0.182 = 1.20
even the largest effect was rather small. See Table 1, Part A, for
details.
MOOD-CONGRUENT VS. MOOD-INCONGRUENT INFORMATION
PROCESSING IN FACES
Turning to Hypothesis 1, and putting age aside for the moment,
there was clear evidence for a mood-congruency effect in emotion
perception. Themore positive participants’ mood, the more likely
they were to perceive happiness in the presented faces. For exam-
ple, someone in a maximally positive mood would have a prob-
ability of [100 ·(1/(1+ e1.978+0.719−0.048·2−0.118·2))] = 8.58% of
perceiving an additional happy expression, but only a probability
of [100 ·(1/(1+ e1.978+0.719−0.048·−2−0.118·−2))] = 4.61% if scor-
ing at the lower end of the mood scale (logit= 0.118; odds ratio=
1.125; p < 0.001). Being in a positive mood also slightly increased
the probability of perceiving an additional neutral expression
(logit= 0.048; odds ratio= 1.049; p < 0.01). However, being in a
positive mood consistently reduced the probability of perceiving
an additional expression for all negatively valenced emotions (i.e.,
anger, disgust, sadness, and fear; see Table 1). See Table 1, Part B.
As apparent from Table 2, a similar pattern held for increas-
ing negative mood. That is, higher levels of negative mood led to
a lower probability of perceiving an additional happy expression
(logit = −0.210; odds ratio = 0.810; p < 0.001), but an increase
in the likelihood to perceive an additional fearful expression (logit
= 0.149; odds ratio = 1.161; p < 0.001). All other emotions fell
somewhere in between (none of them were significant at a 0.05
alpha level).
AGE GROUP DIFFERENCES IN MOOD-CONGRUENT VS.
MOOD-INCONGRUENT INFORMATION PROCESSING
Contradictory to Hypothesis 2, which predicted that older adults
have a higher likelihood of perceiving positive emotions in
facial expressions when being in a bad mood (i.e., mood-
incongruency), a mood-congruency effect was primarily shown
by older adults. Other than younger adults (logit= −0.157; odds
ratio = 0.855; p < 0.001), older adults exhibited a significantly
higher probability of perceiving happiness, when being in a good
mood (logit = 0.151; odds ratio = 1.163; p < 0.001). Figure 2
provides a graphical illustration of the model-predicted probabil-
ities of perceiving an additional happy emotional expression in
faces for younger and older adults with maximally high vs. low
levels of positive mood. As compared to the baseline, higher levels
6Middle-aged adults were chosen as the base group. As pointed out by Cohen
et al. (2003), when using effects coding the base group is usually selected to be
the group “for which comparisons to the mean are of least interest” (p. 322).
This is because the analysis does not inform us directly about this group, but
only indirectly. All information, however, is considered in the analysis. See
Cohen et al. (2003) for more detailed information.
FIGURE 2 | Predicted probability of perceiving an additional happy
emotional expression in faces for younger and older adults with
maximally high (right) vs. maximally low (left) levels of positive mood.
FIGURE 3 | Predicted probability of perceiving an additional happy
emotional expression in faces for younger and older adults with
maximally high (right) vs. maximally low (left) levels of negative
mood.
of positive mood in older adults also increased the likelihood of
perceiving disgust and sadness (logit= 0.076; odds ratio= 1.079;
p < 0.01; logit = 0.081; odds ratio = 1.084; p < 0.01, respec-
tively). In contrast, positive mood in older adults decreased the
likelihood of perceiving neutrality (logit = −0.130; odds ratio =
0.878; p < 0.001). Although the results were somewhat mixed,
the pronounced mood-congruency effect for older adults in the
perception of happiness speaks against Hypothesis 2. See Table 1,
Part C, for details. The effect for negative mood (Table 2) further
bolstered the rejection of Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of negative
mood in older adults decreased the probability of perceiving hap-
piness (logit = −0.550; odds ratio = 0.578; p < 0.001), while no
such decrease was found for younger adults (logit = 0.329; odds
ratio= 1.390; p < 0.001). These results are illustrated in Figure 3.
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THE ROLE OF THE TEMPORAL SEQUENCE IN EMOTION PROCESSING
The probability of perceiving an additional emotional expression
decreased not only across study sessions, but also within each
study session (i.e., with stimulus number; see Table 1, Part D).
While the decrease was somewhat lower and non-significant for
the perception of neutrality (logit= −0.0004; odds ratio= 0.999;
p = 0.295), it was significant for all other emotions (p < 0.01).
At the descriptive level, the downward trend in the likelihood
of reporting an emotional expression, other than neutrality, was
slightly weakened for participants in a positive mood, but none
of the effects was significant at a 0.01 alpha level. Likewise, there
were no three-way interactions with negative mood (see Table 2).
Given the non-significant interaction of positive mood with stim-
ulus number and negative mood with stimulus number, respec-
tively, along with the uniform downward trend in the likelihood
of perceiving an additional emotional expression, there was little
evidence for a shift from mood-congruent to mood-incongruent
information processing as a function of elapsed processing time
in the present study. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was rejected.
EFFECTIVENESS OF EMOTION PERCEPTION IN FACES AS A
MOOD-REGULATORY FUNCTION
In Hypothesis 4 we postulated a positive relationship between the
likelihood of perceiving positively valenced emotions in faces and
subsequent improvements in mood. This hypothesis was based
on prior research suggesting that mood-incongruent informa-
tion processing in older adults, or a shift from mood-congruent
to mood-incongruent information processing as a function of
processing time, may serve a mood-regulatory function—in par-
ticular if initial mood was bad. Given that we found no empirical
support for Hypotheses 2 and 3 this seemed unlikely. To explic-
itly test the effect of emotion perception during a study session
on mood changes from the beginning to the end of a session,
we added the interaction between age group and percentage of
perceived emotional expressions as time varying covariates to
a logistic growth curve model of mood changes as described
above. The results are presented in Figure 4which shows the stan-
dardized effects of emotion perception on pre- to post-session
mood changes across the 10 study sessions, separated for younger,
middle-aged, and older adults, and for all six emotional expres-
sions. As apparent from the 95% confidence intervals, almost
none of the effects were significant and there was no consistent
pattern across time, across emotions, or across age groups. Rather,
most effects varied around zero, providing no empirical support
for Hypothesis 4.
DISCUSSION
We began this work by asking how the way we feel influences the
perception of the world around us, and how this perception may
affect our own feelings. We approached this question by studying
the relationship between natural mood (as opposed to experi-
mentally induced mood) and the attribution of emotions to faces
for which the primary emotional expression had been correctly
identified.
Consistent with our expectations in Hypothesis 1, more pos-
itive mood increased the likelihood of perceiving a happy facial
expression. In particular older adults had a higher likelihood of
reporting the perception of happiness in faces when being in a
positive mood, and a lower likelihood when being in a negative
mood. Likewise, older adults were increasingly less likely to per-
ceive happiness in faces when in a more negative mood. Both
findings did not apply to younger adults. This stands in con-
trast to Hypothesis 2 which predicted that older adults have a
higher likelihood of perceiving positive emotions in facial expres-
sions when in a bad mood. In contrast to previous reports in
the literature (Forgas and Ciarrochi, 2002; Isaacowitz et al., 2008,
2009a), we found neither evidence for a change from mood-
congruent tomood-incongruent responses over time (Hypothesis
3) nor for a mood-regulatory effect of emotion processing in faces
(Hypothesis 4). In the remainder of the discussion we will offer
interpretations for our central findings.
MOOD-CONGRUENT INFORMATION PROCESSING
Although partly in contrast to our expectations based on previous
research using active mood induction in controlled laboratory
settings, our results may be explained in terms of the AIM. The
fact that older adults showed a mood-congruency effect in emo-
tion perception suggests their use of a high affect infusion strat-
egy such as heuristic or substantive processing. Unfortunately,
the present study does not allow us to clearly disentangle the
underlying mechanisms in terms of heuristic vs. substantive pro-
cessing. Even though this remains an important topic to be
addressed in future research, we believe that the observed mood-
congruent information processing in older adults may even be
due to a combination of the two processing strategies. On the
one hand—and independent of present mood—older compared
to younger adults were not only more likely to indicate the per-
ception of an additional happy but also an additional neutral
facial expression (see Tables 1, 2). This may reflect their higher
personal involvement in the task, which suggests the use of a
substantive processing strategy. On the other hand, reducing cog-
nitive resources may have let older adults rely stronger on other
sources of information, such as their current mood, support-
ing the notion of a heuristic (mood-as-information) processing
strategy.
For younger adults in contrast, the increase in the perception
of happiness almost completely disappeared (see Figure 2), sug-
gesting their use of a low affect infusion strategy such asmotivated
processing or the direct access strategy. Themotivation to increase
one’s mood—in particular when in a badmood—should not only
eliminate a mood-congruency effect, but should result in mood-
incongruent information processing (i.e., an increased likelihood
of perceiving happiness). The fact that we did not observe such
an effect, rather suggests the use of a direct access strategy in
younger adults. As described in the introduction, this strategy
is particularly likely when “the judge is not personally involved,
and there are no strong cognitive, affective, motivational, or sit-
uational forces mandating more elaborate processing” (Forgas,
1995, p. 46).
MOOD-INCONGRUENT INFORMATION PROCESSING AS A
MOOD-REGULATORY FUNCTION
As apparent from Figure 4, there was no empirical support that
emotion perception in faces serves a mood-regulatory function
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FIGURE 4 | Standardized effects of perceived happiness, anger, disgust,
sadness, neutrality, and fear on changes between pre- to post-session
mood for younger, middle-aged, and older participants. In six separate
analyses (for the six emotions), the interaction between perceived
emotional expression and age group was entered as a time-varying
covariate with time-varying effects into a logistic growth curve model of
changes in mood changes across the 10 study sessions (see Voelkle et al.,
2013).
under conditions of natural occurring mood rather than actively
induced mood. This stands in contrast to research using exper-
imentally induced mood, which showed that the focus of older
adults in a bad mood on positively valenced faces may help to
regulate their mood. One reason for these different findings may
be that the naturally occurring fluctuations in positive mood
assessed in the present context were not sufficiently strong to
reveal such an effect. Furthermore, ascribing an additional emo-
tional expression to a face whose primary emotion had been
correctly recognized is, of course, a much more subtle measure of
mood-(in)congruent emotion processing as compared, for exam-
ple, to gaze patterns toward prototypically positively or negatively
valenced facial expressions as used in the study by Isaacowitz et al.
(2008). In addition, the anticipatory (down)adjustment of posi-
tive mood may have further reduced the likelihood of discovering
such an effect (Voelkle et al., 2013).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We believe the general downward trend in the likelihood of
reporting an emotional expression is likely due to participant’s
increasing fatigue and decreasing motivation. However, it is
a shortcoming of the present study that these factors were
not assessed in self-report, thus this belief remains speculative.
Although we statistically controlled for the downward trend, the
remaining variability in mood and emotion perception may have
been too small to allow for additional mood regulation effects
by means of emotion perception. After all, if an individual’s
mood is already perfectly adjusted to the situation at hand—or if
fatigue effects are very strong—there is little room for additional
regulation via mood-incongruent information processing.
This may be viewed as a shortcoming of the present study.
However, it also shows that while natural mood (as opposed to
experimentally induced mood) is likely to affect the perception of
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emotions in faces, a possible mood-regulatory effect of such per-
ception seems negligible. In fact, we found that in particular for
older adults, positive mood may rather increase the likelihood of
perceiving positively valenced facial expressions.
The somewhat undifferentiated take on emotions and mood
may be considered another weakness of the study. Future research
may profit from more fine-grained distinctions between differ-
ent aspects of positive and negative mood, including different
aspects of valence and arousal, and a discrete emotion perspec-
tive as outlined by Kunzmann et al. (2014) in this issue. However,
the primary purpose of the present paper was not to offer a
comprehensive framework on age-related changes in the intricate
interplay between specific aspects of affective experience and the
perception (attribution) of additional emotions in faces whose
primary emotion were correctly specified. Rather the focus was
to place research on emotion perception in faces into the broader
context on mood-congruent vs. mood-incongruent information
processing. To accomplish this goal it is necessary to remain at
a more general level, although we do report more detailed find-
ings. In the same way we encourage future research to focus
on more detailed aspects of experienced mood and the per-
ception of emotional expression, we, thus, also encourage more
integrative research linking these findings back to more general
research on age-related changes in mood-(in)congruent informa-
tion processing.We hope the present paper will contribute to both
ends.
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